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Abstract
We study the influence of entanglement and correlated noise using cor-
related amplitude damping, depolarizing and phase damping channels on
the quantum Stackelberg duopoly. Our investigations show that under
the action of amplitude damping channel a critical point exists for unen-
tangled initial state as well, at which firms get equal payoffs. The game
becomes a follower advantage game when the channel is highly decohered.
Two critical points corresponding to two values of the entanglement angle
are found in the presence of correlated noise. Within the range of these
limits of entanglement angle, the game is follower advantage game. In case
of depolarizing channel, the payoffs of the two firms are strongly influenced
by the memory parameter. The presence of quantum memory ensures the
existence of Nash equilibrium for the entire range of decoherence and en-
tanglement parameters for both the channels. A local maximum in the
payoffs is observed which vanishes as the channel correlation increases.
Moreover, under the influence of depolarizing channel, the game is always
a leader advantage game. Furthermore, it is seen that phase damping
channel does not effect the outcome of the game.
PACS: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 05.30.-d.
Keywords: Quantum channels; correlated noise; Stackelberg duopoly.
1 Introduction
Game theory is the mathematical study of interaction among independent, self
interested agents. It emerged from the work of Von Neumann [1], and is now
used in various disciplines like economics, biology, medical sciences, social sci-
ences and physics [2, 3]. Due to dramatic development in quantum information
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theory [4], the game theorists [5-12] have made strenuous efforts to extend the
classical game theory into the quantum domain. The first attempt in this direc-
tion was made by Meyer [13] by quantizing a simple coin tossing game. Applica-
tions of quantum games are reviewed by several authors [14-18]. A formulation
of quantum game theory based on the Schmidt decomposition is presented by
Ichikawa et al. [19]. Recently, Xia et al. [20, 21] have investigated the quantum
Stackelberg duopoly game under the influence of decoherence and have found
a critical point for the maximally entangled initial state against the damping
parameter for the amplitude damping environment under certain conditions.
In practice no system can be fully isolated from its environment. The in-
teraction between system and environment leads to the destruction of quantum
coherence of the system. It produces an inevitable noise and results in the loss
of information encoded in the system [22]. This gives rise to the phenomenon
of decoherence. Quantum information are encoded in qubits during its trans-
mission from one party to another and require communication channels. In a
realistic situation, the qubits have a nontrivial dynamics during transmission
because of their interaction with the environment. Therefore, a party may re-
ceive a set of distorted qubits because of the disturbing action of the channel.
Studies on quantum channels have attracted a lot of attention in recent past
[23, 24]. Early work in this direction was devoted mainly to memoryless channels
for which consecutive signal transmissions through the channel were not corre-
lated. In the correlated channels (i.e. the channels with memory), the noise
acts on consecutive uses of the channel. The effect of decoherence and corre-
lated noise in quantum games have produced interesting results and is studied
by number of authors [23-28].
In this paper, we study the effect of correlated noise introduced through
amplitude damping, phase damping and depolarizing channels parameterized
by the decoherence parameters p1 and p2 and the memory parameters µ1 and
µ2, on the quantum Stackelberg duopoly game. The decoherence parameters pi
and the memory parameters µi range from 0 to 1. The lower and upper limits
of decoherence parameter pi correspond to the undecohered and fully decohered
cases, respectively. Whereas the lower and upper limits of memory parameter
µi correspond to the uncorrelated and fully correlated cases, respectively. It is
seen that there exists a critical point in the case of amplitude damping channel
for initially unentangled state at which both firms have equal payoffs. The
game transforms from leader advantage to the follower advantage game beyond
this point, for highly decohered case in the presence of memory. For initially
entangled state under the influence of amplitude damping channel we found two
critical points. The game behaves as a follower advantage game within these two
critical points. In the case of depolarizing channel the high correlation results
in high payoffs. However, phase damping channel has no effect on the game
dynamics.
2
2 Stackelberg duopoly game
Stackelberg duopoly is a market game, which is rather different from the Cournot
duopoly game. In Cournot duopoly game, two firms simultaneously provide a
homogeneous product to the market and guess that what action the opponent
will take. However Stackelberg duopoly is a dynamic model of duopoly game
in which one firm, say firm A moves first and the other firm, say B, goes after.
Before making its decision, firm B observes the move of firm A. This transforms
the static nature of Cournot duopoly game to a dynamic one. Firm A is usually
called the leader and firm B the follower, on this basis the game is also called
the leader-follower model [30]. In classical Stackelberg duopoly it is assumed
that firm B will respond optimally to the strategic decision of firm A. As firm A
can precisely predict firm B’s strategic decision, firm A chooses its move in such
a way that maximizes its own payoff. This informational asymmetry makes the
Stackelberg duopoly as the first mover advantage game.
A number of authors have proposed various quantization protocols for ob-
serving the behavior of Stackelberg duopoly game in the quantum realm [9,29-
32]. It has been shown that quantum entanglement affects payoff of the first
mover and produces an equilibrium that corresponds to classical static form of
the same game [33]. The effects of decoherence produced by various prototype
quantum channels on quantum Stackelberg duopoly have been studied by Zhu
et al. [20]. We study the effects of correlated noise on quantum Stackelberg
duopoly, using amplitude damping, phase damping and depolarizing channels.
3 Calculations
In a quantum Stackelberg duopoly game, for each firm A and B the game space
is a two dimensional complex Hilbert space of basis vectors |0〉 and |1〉, that is,
the game consists of two qubits, one for each firm. We consider that the initial
state of the game is given by
|ψi〉 = cos θ|00〉+ sin θ|11〉 (1)
where θ is a measure of entanglement. The state is maximally entangled at
θ = pi
4
. In the presence of noise the evolution of an arbitrary system can be
described in terms of Kraus operators as [4]
ρ =
∑
l
ElρiE
†
l (2)
where ρi = |ψi〉〈ψi| is the initial density matrix and the Kraus operators El
satisfy the following completeness relation
∑
l
E†l El = 1 (3)
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The single qubit Kraus operators for uncorrelated quantum amplitude damping
channel are given as [23, 24]
E0 =
(
1 0
0
√
1− p
)
, E1 =
(
0
√
p
0 0
)
(4)
The Kraus operators for amplitude damping channel with correlated noise for
a two qubit system are given as [24]
Ec00 =


√
1− p 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

 , Ec11 =


0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0√
p 0 0 0

 (5)
The action of such a channel on the the initial density matrix of the system is
given by
ρ = (1− µ)
1∑
m,n=0
Eumn ρiE
u†
mn + µ
1∑
l=0
Ecll ρiE
c†
ll (6)
where the superscripts u and c represent the uncorrelated and correlated parts
of the channel, respectively. The above relation means that with probability
µ the noise is correlated and with probability (1− µ) it is uncorrelated. The
Kraus operators for phase damping channel with uncorrelated noise for a system
of two qubits are given as [23, 24]
Eumn =
√
emenσm ⊗ σn, m, n = 0, 3 (7)
whereas the one with correlated noise are given as
Ecll =
√
elσl ⊗ σl, l = 0, 3 (8)
Similarly, the Kraus operators for depolarizing channel are described by equa-
tions (7) and (8) with indices run from 0 to 3. Where σ0 is identity operator for
a single qubit and σ1, σ2 and σ3 are the Pauli spin operators. For phase damping
channel, e0 = (1− pi) and e3 = pi and for depolarizing channel e0 = (1− pi),
e1 = e2 = e3 =
1
3
pi, where pi correspond to the decoherence parameters of the
first and second use of the channel. The action of such a channel on the quan-
tum system can be defined in a similar fashion as described earlier in equation
(6).
In quantum Stackelberg duopoly game each firm has two possible strategies
I, the identity operator and C, the inversion operator or Pauli’s bit-flip operator.
Let x and 1 − x stand for the probabilities of I and C that firm A applies and
y, 1 − y, are the probabilities that firm B applies, respectively. The final state
after the action of the channel is given by [32]
ρf = xyIA ⊗ IB ρ I†A ⊗ I†B + x (1− y) IA ⊗ CB ρ I†A ⊗ C†B
+y (1− x)CA ⊗ IB ρ C†A ⊗ I†B
+(1− x) (1− y)CA ⊗ CB ρ C†A ⊗ C†B (9)
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where ρ (equation (6)) is the density matrix of the game after the channel action.
Suppose that the player’s moves in the quantum Stackelberg duopoly are
given by probabilities lying in the range [0, 1]. In classical duopoly game the
moves of firms A and B are given by quantities q1 and q2, which have values
in the range [0,∞). We assume that firms A and B agree on a function that
uniquely defines a real positive number in the range (0, 1] for every quantity q1,
q2 in [0,∞). Such a function is given by 1/(1 + qi), so that firms A and B find
x and y, respectively, as
x =
1
1 + q1
, y =
1
1 + q2
(10)
The payoffs of firms A and B are given by the following trace operations
PA (q1, q2) = Tr
[
ρfP
op
A (q1, q2)
]
, PB (q1, q2) = Tr
[
ρfP
op
B (q1, q2)
]
(11)
where P opA , P
op
B are payoff operators of the firms and are given by
P opA (q1, q2) =
q1
q12
(kρ11 − ρ22 − ρ33)
P opB (q1, q2) =
q2
q12
(kρ11 − ρ22 − ρ33) (12)
where ρii are the diagonal elements of the final density matrix, k is a constant
as given in ref. [30] and q12 is given by
q12 =
1
(1 + q1) (1 + q2)
(13)
The backward-induction outcome in the Stackelberg duopoly is found by
first finding the reaction R2 (q1) of firm B to an arbitrary quantity q1 chosen
by firm A. It is found by differentiating firm B’s payoff with respect to q2, and
maximizing the result for q1 and can be written as
R2 (q1) = maxPB (q1, q2) (14)
Once firm B chooses this quantity, firm A can compute its optimization problem
by differentiating its own payoff with respect to q1and then maximizing it to
find the value q1 = q
∗
1 . Using the value of q
∗
1 in equation (14) we can get the
value of q∗2 . These quantities define the backward-induction outcome of quantum
Stackelberg duopoly game and represent the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
point. The payoffs of the firms at this point can be found using equation (11).
4 Results and discussion
We suppose that before the firms measure their payoffs the game evolves twice
through different quantum correlated channels. That is, the state, prior and
after the firms apply their operators, is influenced by the correlated noisy chan-
nels.
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4.1 Correlated amplitude damping channel
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point for the game under the influence
of correlated quantum amplitude damping channel becomes
q∗1 =
−k cos2 θ +A1 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
−4 +A2 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
q∗2 =
1
4
k cos2 θ −B1 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
16 +B2 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
(15)
where the damping function Ai and Bi are given in appendix A.
If we consider the influence of decoherence in the second evolution only
(p1 = 0), equation (15) for unentangled initial state reduces to the following
form
q∗1 =
1
2− 4p2(1− µ2)
q∗2 =
1− 2p2(1− µ2)
2[2− p2{6− 5µ2 − p2(1− µ2)(5 − 8µ2)}]
(16)
Here we have taken k = 1. The firms’ payoffs under this situation become
PA =
1
8− 16p2(1− µ2)
PB =
1− 2p2(1− µ2)
8{2− p2(6− 5µ2) + p22(8µ2 + 5)(µ2 − 1)}
(17)
In the classical form of the duopoly the perfect game Nash equilibrium is a
point, whereas in this case it is a function of both decoherence and memory
parameters. It can be easily seen that the results of ref. [20] are retrieved by
setting µ2 = 0, and setting p2 = 0 reproduces the results of classical game. The
existence of Nash equilibrium requires that firms’ moves (q∗1 and q
∗
2) should have
positive values. It can easily be checked using equation (16) that in the absence
of quantum memory, no Nash equilibrium exists for p2 >
1
2
. The presence of
quantum memory allows the existence of Nash equilibrium for the entire range of
values of p2, when µ2 ≥ 0.85. To see the influence of decoherence and quantum
memory on firms’ payoffs at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we plot
the payoffs (equation (17)) in figure 1 as a function of decoherence parameter
p2. In the figure the dotted and dashed-dotted lines represent firm A and firm
B payoffs for unentangled initial state, respectively. The superscripts u and
e of PA (PB) in the figure stand for unentangled and entangled initial states
respectively. It can be seen from the figure that a critical point exists due to the
presence of memory at which both firms are equally benefited. This situation
has not been observed, in the absence of memory, for unentangled initial state of
the game. That is, in the absence of quantum memory the game is always first
mover advantage game. For highly decohered channel and µ < 1, a transition
from first mover advantage into second mover advantage occurs in the game
6
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Figure 1: The payoffs (PA(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) and PB(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2)) are plotted at the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium point against the decoherence parameter p2 both for
entangled and unentangled initial states under the action of amplitude damping
channel, with values of other parameters k = 1 and p1 = µ1 = 0. For maximally
entangled initial state the memory parameter µ2 = 0.9, and for unentangled
initial state µ2 = 0.7
behavior. It can also be seen from equation (17) that for fully correlated and
fully decohered channel, both firms are equally benefited and get a payoff equal
to 1
8
. It can also be shown that for smaller values of decoherence, the game is
always first mover advantage irrespective of the value of the quantum memory.
For a maximally entangled initial state of the game, the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium point becomes
q∗1 =
1− 3p22(−1 + µ2)− p2(2− 3µ2)
4− 8p2(1− µ2)
q∗2 =
[[−1 + p2{2 + 3p2(−1 + µ2)− 3µ2}]
×{1 + 2p2(−1 + µ2)}]
[−7 + p2(28− 26µ2) + 9p42(−1 + µ2)2 + p22
×(−22 + 46µ2 − 23µ22)− 6p32(2− 5µ2 + 3µ22)]
(18)
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The firms’ payoffs corresponding to these values of q∗i become
PA =
{−1 + p2(2− 3µ2) + 3p22(−1 + µ2)}2
32(1 + 2p2(−1 + µ2))
PB =
[−{1 + 2p2(−1 + µ2)}{−1 + p2(2− 3µ2)
+3p22(−1 + µ2)}2]
[8{−7 + p2(28− 26µ2) + 9p42(−1 + µ2)2
+p22(−22 + 46µ2 − 23µ22)− 6p32(2 − 5µ2 + 3µ22)}]
(19)
One can easily check that these results reduce to the results of refs. [20, 33] by
setting µ2 = 0 and p2 = 0 respectively. The payoffs of firms for the maximally
entangled initial state are plotted as function of decoherence parameter p2 in
figure 1. The solid line represents firm A payoff and the dashed line represents
firm B payoff for maximally entangled initial state. One can easily check that
for a maximally entangled initial state, the presence of quantum memory makes
the firms better off as compared to the uncorrelated case of the channel. Fur-
thermore, quantum memory shifts the critical point to higher payoffs than the
critical point for maximally entangled initial state when the channel is uncor-
related. This can also be shown that for a given decoherence level, the firms
become worse off and the game becomes a follower advantage as the channel
becomes more correlated. The effect of entanglement in the initial state on the
firms’ payoffs is shown in figure 2. Here we have taken into account the two
decohering correlated processes. It can be checked that for certain range of de-
coherence parameters, in the absence of quantum memory, the moves of firms
are negative. This means that no Nash equilibrium exists in the region of these
values of decoherence parameters. The presence of quantum memory, however,
resolves this problem. As can be seen from figure 2, the presence of quantum
memory in the payoff functions results into two critical points corresponding to
two different values of entanglement parameter. The game is a follower advan-
tage in this range of entanglement angle. The leader firm is worse off in this
range of values of θ and a global minimum in payoffs occurs at θ = pi
2
.
4.2 Correlated Depolarizing channel
When the game evolves under the influence of correlated depolarizing channel,
the moves of firms at subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point become
q∗1 =
81k cos2 θ +A′1 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
3244 +A′2 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
q∗2 =
6561k cos2 θ +B′1 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
52488 +B′2 (p1, p2, µ1, µ2)
(20)
where the damping parameters A′1, A
′
2, B
′
1 and B
′
2 are given in appendix A. For
unentangled initial state, firms’ payoffs at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
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Figure 2: The payoffs of the two firms are plotted at the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium point against the entanglement angle θ under the action of
amplitude damping channel, with other parameters p1 = p2 = 0.5, k = 1 and
µ1 = µ2 = 0.5.
point become
PA = − (3− 2p2)
2{1 + 2p2(−1 + µ2)}2
24{−3− 6p2(−1 + µ2) + 4p22(−1 + µ2)}
PB = − (3− 2p2)
2{1 + 2p2(−1 + µ2)}2{−3 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
48[9 + p2(−3 + 2p2){10 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)2 − 9µ2}]
(21)
where we have considered decoherence only in the second evolution of the game
and have set k = 1. It can easily be checked that for uncorrelated channel, firms’
moves for p2 > 0.5 become negative and hence no Nash equilibrium exits for
p2 > 0.5. On the other hand, it can be easily shown that the Nash equilibrium
exits for the entire range of values of decoherence parameter, when the channel
is correlated. The effect of quantum memory on firms’ payoffs for unentangled
initial state under depolarizing channel is shown in figure 3. The dashed line
represents firm A’s payoff and dashed-dotted line represnets firm B’s payoff for
unentangled initial state. The payoffs grow up with increasing value of memory
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Figure 3: The payoffs (PA(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) and PB(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2)) are plotted at the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium point against the memory parameter µ2 both for en-
tangled and unentangled initial states under the action of depolarizing channel,
with the other parameters p1 = µ1 = 0, k = 1 and p2 = 0.5
parameter and the game remains the first mover advantage game.
When the initial state is maximally entangled and only the second decohering
process is taken into account, the moves and payoffs of the firms for k = 1
become
q∗1 =
1
2
+
3
4{−3 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
q∗2 =
{−3 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}{−3 + 4p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
63 + 8p2(−3 + 2p2){−9 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}(−1 + µ2)
(22)
PA = − {3− 4p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
2
96{−3 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
PB = − {3− 4p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
2{−3 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}
24[63 + 8p2(−3 + 2p2){−9 + 2p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)}(−1 + µ2)]
(23)
From equation (22) one can easily check that no Nash equilibrium exists for
decoherence parameter p2 > 0.32 when the channel is uncorrelated. However,
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the presence of quantum correlations ensure the presence of Nash equilibrium for
the entire range of decoherence parameter. It can be checked that for a given
value of memory parameter the payoffs decrease when plotted as function of
decoherence parameter and the game is always first mover advantage game. The
dependence of payoffs for the maximally entangled initial state on the memory
parameter is shown in figure 3. The solid line in the figure represents firm A’s
payoff and the dotted line represents firm B’s payoff for the maximally entangled
initial state. It can be seen that the game is no-payoff game around µ2 = 0.25.
For other values of memory parameter, the game is first mover advantage game
and the firms are better off when the channel is fully correlated.
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Figure 4: The payoffs (PA(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2) and PB(q
∗
1 , q
∗
2)) are plotted at the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium point against the memory parameter µ2 both for en-
tangled and unentangled initial states under the action of depolarizing channel,
with the other parameters p1 = µ1 = 0, k = 1 and p2 = 0.5
To analyze the effect of entanglement in the initial state of the game on the
Nash equilibrium, we plot the firms’ moves q∗1 , q
∗
2 in figures 4 and 5, respectively.
From figure 4, one can see that the move of the leader firm is positive for the
whole range of entanglement angle. However, for memory parameters µ1 =
µ2 < 0.5, the move q2 of the follower firm is negative for a particular range of
values of entanglement parameter θ as can be seen from figure 5. The negative
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Figure 5: The move of firm B at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point
under the influence of depolarizing channel is plotted against the entanglement
angle θ with other parameters p1 = p2 = 0.25, k = 1.
value of q2 shows that no Nash equilibrium of the game exists in this range of
values of θ. On the other hand, the existence of Nash equilibrium is ensured for
the whole range of values of the entanglement parameter for highly correlated
channel. The payoffs of firms as function of entanglement parameter are plotted
in figures 6 and 7. A local maximum exists at θ = pi for smaller values of memory
parameters which disappears for the values of memory parameters > 0.5.
4.3 Correlated phase damping channel
The diagonal elements of the final density matrix of the game when it evolves
under the action of correlated phase damping channel are given by
ρ′11 = q12(cos
2 θ + q1q2 sin
2 θ)
ρ′22 = q12(q2 cos
2 θ + q1 sin
2 θ)
ρ′33 = q12(q1 cos
2 θ + q2 sin
2 θ)
ρ′44 = q12(q1q2 cos
2 θ + sin2 θ) (24)
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Figure 6: The payoff of firm A at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point
under the influence of depolarizing channel is plotted against the entanglement
angle θ with other parameters p1 = p2 = 0.25, k = 1.
The payoffs of firms in quantum Stackelberg duopoly game depend only on the
diagonal elements of the final density matrix as can be seen from equations (11
and 12). It is clear from equation (24) that the diagonal elements of the final
density matrix are independent of the decoherence parameters as well as from
the memory parameters. Therefore, the correlated phase damping channel does
not effect the outcome of the game.
5 Conclusions
We study the influence of entanglement and correlated noise on the quantum
Stackelberg duopoly game by considering the time correlated amplitude damp-
ing, depolarizing and phase damping channels using Kraus operator formalism.
We have shown that in different entangling regions the follower advantage can
be enhanced or weakened due to the existence of the initial state entanglement
influenced by different correlated noise channels. The problem of nonexistence
of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in various regions due to the presence
of decoherence is resolved by quantum memory.
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Figure 7: The payoff of firm B at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point
under the influence of depolarizing channel is plotted against the entanglement
angle θ with the following values of the other parameters p1 = p2 = 0.25, k = 1.
It is shown that under the action of amplitude damping channel, for initially
unentangled state, the presence of quantum memory results into a critical point
at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The firms are equally benefited at
this point and the leader advantage vanishes. Beyond this critical point, the
Nash equilibrium of the game gives higher payoff to the follower firm as a result
of quantum memory, that is, the game converts from leader advantage to the
follower advantage game. Quantum memory, in the case of amplitude damping
channel, favors the follower firm in a particular range of values of entanglement
parameter at the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In this range of values of
entanglement parameter, the leader firm get worse off and the follower firm is
better off (see figure 2). It is also observed that quantum memory validates the
existence of Nash equilibrium for the whole range of entanglement angle and
decoherence parameter. It is also shown that quantum memory in the case of
phase damping channel has no effect on the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
and thus does not change the outcome of the game.
In the case of depolarizing channel quantum memory and entanglement in
the initial state influences the firms’ payoffs at the subgame perfect Nash equi-
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librium strongly in a way different from amplitude damping channel. It is seen
that for p > 0.32, no Nash equilibrium exists in case of unentangled initial
state. Whereas the presence of entanglement in the initial state extends the
span of decoherence parameter p from 0 − 0.32 to 0 − 0.5 for the existence of
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the absence of quantum memory. On the
other hand, we have observed that in the presence of memory, the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium exists for the entire range of decoherence parameter in
both of the situations (for entangled and unentangled initial states). Similarly,
it has been shown that memory has a striking effect that there exists a Nash
equilibrium of the game for the entire range of entanglement parameter as well.
Whereas, in the absence of memory, the noisy environment limits the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium to exist in a particular range of entanglement angle.
In addition, a local maximum in payoffs is observed for small values of quantum
memory parameters µ1, µ2. For highly correlated channel this local maximum
disappears and the payoffs reduce to zero. Unlike amplitude damping channel,
the correlated depolarizing channel does not give rise to a critical point at the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and as a result, the game always remains a
leader advantage game.
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Appendix A
The damping functions Ai in equation (15) are given as
A1 =
1
2
[−k − 4(−1 + p1)(−1 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)
−2kp2(p2 + µ2 − p2µ2)− 2kp1[µ1 + p2{2− p2(−2 + µ1)
×(−1 + µ2)− 4µ2 + µ1(−2 + 3µ2)}]
−k cos 2θ + 4(−1 + p1)(−1 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2) cos 2θ
+2kp2(p2 + µ2 − p2µ2) cos 2θ + 2kp1[µ1 + p2{2− p2(−2 + µ1)
×(−1 + µ2)− 4µ2 + µ1(−2 + 3µ2)}] cos 2θ]− 2p1(−1 + µ1)
×[2 + p1[−2 + k{−1 + p2(2− 3µ2) + p22(−1 + µ2)}
−4p2(−1 + µ2) + 2p22(−1 + µ2)] + 4p2(−1 + µ2)
−2p22(−1 + µ2)] sin2 θ (25)
15
A2 = −4(1 + k)p2(−1 + µ2)− 4(−1 + p1)p1(−1 + µ1)
×[−2 + k{−1 + p2(2− 3µ2) + p22(−1 + µ2)}
−4p2(−1 + µ2) + 2p22(−1 + µ2)] sin2 θ (26)
The damping functions Bi in equation (15) are given as
B1 = −2 + 1
8
k[1 + 2p2(p2 + µ2 − p2µ2)
+2p1[µ1 + p2{2− 4µ2 + µ1(−2 + 3µ2)}]
+[1− 2[p2(p2 + µ2 − p2µ2) + p1{µ1 + p2(2− 2µ1
−4µ2 + 3µ1µ2)}]] cos 2θ]−
1
2
p1(−1 + µ1)[k(−4 + 3p1)
×{−1 + p2(2− 3µ2) + p22(−1 + µ2)} + 6(−1 + p1){−1− 2p2
×(−1 + µ2) + p22(−1 + µ2)}] sin2 θ −
1
2
p2(−1 + µ2)
×[4(1 + k) + [2(−1 + p2) + p1{2 + p2(−2 + k(−2 + µ1))}] sin2 θ]
(27)
B2 = −16 + 2[2{−1− (1 + k)p2(−1 + µ2)}+ p21(−1 + µ1)
×[(2 + k)(−1 + p2)2 + p2{4 + 3k − (2 + k)p2}µ2]
+p1(−1 + µ1)[−(2 + k)(−1 + p2)2 + p2{−4− 3k
+(2 + k)p2}µ2] + (−1 + p1)p1(−1 + µ1)[−(2 + k)(−1 + p2)2
+p2{−4− 3k + (2 + k)p2}µ2] cos 2θ][{1 + (1 + k)p2
×(−1 + µ2)} cos2 θ + [1 + (1 + k)p2(−1 + µ2) + p1(−1 + µ1)
×[(2 + k)(−1 + p2)2 + p2{4 + 3k − (2 + k)p2}µ2]
+p21(−1 + µ1)[−(2 + k)(−1 + p2)2 + p2{−4− 3k
+(2 + k)p2}µ2] sin2 θ]− [−2(−1 + p1)[p1(−1 + µ1)
×{−1 + (−2 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)}+ (−1 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)]
−k[1 + p2(p2 + µ2 − p2µ2) + p21(−1 + µ1){−(−1 + p2)2
+(−3 + p2)p2µ2}+ p1[µ1 + p2{2− p2(−2 + µ1)(−1 + µ2)
−4µ2 + µ1(−2 + 3µ2)}]] + (−1 + p1)[2{p1(−1 + µ1)
×{−1 + (−2 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)}+ (−1 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)}
+k[(−1 + p2){−1 + p2(−1 + µ2)}+ p1(−1 + µ1){−(−1 + p2)2
+(−3 + p2)p2µ2}]] cos 2θ][p2{−2− (2 + k)p2(−1 + µ2)
+(2 + k)µ2} cos2 θ + [2p1[−1 + µ1 + p1(−1 + µ1)
×{−1 + (−2 + p2)p2(−1 + µ2)} − p2{1 + (−2 + p2)µ1}(−1 + µ2)]
+k[1 + p1[−2 + µ1 + p1(−1 + µ1){−(−1 + p2)2 + (−3 + p2)p2µ2}
+p2{2− 2µ2 + µ1(−2 + p2 + 3µ2 − p2µ2)}]]] sin2 θ] (28)
The damping functions A′i in equation (20) are given as
16
A′1 = 4(2 + k)p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1){−9 + 8p2(−3 + 2p2)
×(−1 + µ2)} − 36(2 + k)p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)
+
9
2
k[9 + {9− 24p2 + 8p1(−3 + 4p2)} cos 2θ] (29)
A′2 = 8(2 + k)[p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1){−9 + 8p2(−3 + 2p2)
×(−1 + µ2)} − 9p2(−3 + 2p2)(−1 + µ2)] (30)
The damping functions B′i in equation (20) are given as
B′1 = 8(2 + k)
2(3− 2p2)2p22{9− 8p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}2
×[k{−9 + 4p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}+ 8p1(−3 + 2p1)
×(−1 + µ1)− k(−3 + 4p1)(−3 + 4p2) cos 2θ] + 18(2 + k)
×p2(−3 + 2p2){−9 + 8p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}(−1 + µ2)
×[(2 + k){9− 8p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}+ k(−3 + 4p1)
×(−3 + 4p2) cos 2θ] (31)
B′2 = −72(2 + k)p2(−3 + 2p2)[4{−9 + 2p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}
+k{9 + 4p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}]{−9 + 8p1
×(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}(−1 + µ2) + 16(2 + k)2(3− 2p2)2
×p22{9− 8p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}2(−1 + µ2)2
+81[k2{−81 + 8p1(−3 + 2p1){9 + 2p1(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}
×(−1 + µ1)}+ 64p1(−3 + 2p1){−9 + p1(−3 + 2p1)
×(−1 + µ1)}(−1 + µ1) + 16kp1(−3 + 2p1){−9 + 4p1
×(−3 + 2p1)(−1 + µ1)}(−1 + µ1) + k2(3 − 4p1)2
×(3− 4p2)2 cos2 2θ] (32)
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